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Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent techniques for the
design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed, such techniques enable automatic synthesis:
given a model of the environment and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques
automatically produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider a class
of concurrent, weighted, multi-player games that are well-suited to model and study the interactions
of several agents who are competing for some measurable resources like energy. We prove that a
subclass of those games always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play
in such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies yielding those Nash
equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents deviate from the equilibrium, all the others
form a coalition that will enforce a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply
those results to a real-life case study in which several smart houses that produce their own energy
with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in micro-grid, must distribute the use of this
energy along the day in order to avoid consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid.
We demonstrate that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these houses: using
penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we force the houses to follow a pre-computed
schedule that maximises the proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.
1 Introduction
A recent and well-established research direction in the field of the design of digital controller for critical
systems consists in applying concepts, models and algorithms borrowed from game theory to perform
automatic synthesis (construction) of correct controllers. The contributions of the present article are part
of this research effort. In the setting of automatic synthesis, the controller we want to build is a player
(using the vocabulary of game theory), and the specification that the controller should satisfy is cast as
a game objective that the controller player should enforce at all times, regardless of the behaviour of the
environment. The environment itself is modeled as another player (or a set of players). Thus, computing
automatically a correct and formally validated (with respect to the specification) controller boils down
to computing a winning strategy for the controller, i.e. a strategy that ensures this player to win the
game whatever the other players play. System synthesis through a game-based approach has nowadays
reached a fair amount of maturity, in particular thanks to the development of several tools (such as
∗The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme
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UppAal TiGa [1], UppAal Stratego [7] and Prism Games [5]) that have been applied successfully to real
life case studies (see for instance [6, 4, 10]). Until recently, however, the research has mainly focused
on two-player games, where the players (the system and the environment) have antagonistic objectives.
This approach allows one to model and reason on centralised control only. Although multi-player games
have been studied from an algorithmic point of view, strategic forms of those games have been mainly
considered, and the study of multi-player games played on graphs—the kind of model we need in our
setting—is relatively recent. This research direction is part of the CASSTING project1, whose aim is to
propose new techniques for the synthesis of collective adaptive systems. Such systems are decentralised
and consist of several modules/agents interacting with each other. While the idea of using games remains,
using multi-player games for synthesis of collective adaptive systems represents a huge leap in game
theory for synthesis. Indeed, in adversarial games the main goal is to find winning (or optimal in a
quantitative setting) strategies, whereas in multi-player games, one wants to synthesise controllers by
computing equilibria (such as Nash equilibria [11]) characterising an adequate behaviour of each agent.
In this article, we consider a class of quantitative multi-player games that are well-suited to model
systems where a quantity grows or decreases along the plays (this quantity can model some energy level,
economic gain/loss, or any other measurable resource). More precisely, the game models a multi-state
system where the players choose their actions concurrently (at the same time), and the next state is a func-
tion of the current state and the players’ actions. Going from one state to another can result in a positive
or negative cost for the players. One can give two semantics to these games, either an infinite horizon
semantics where the plays are infinite and the players want to minimize the limit (inferior/superior) of
the partial sum of the costs; or a finite horizon semantics where the goal of each player is to reach some
target state, and minimize the sum of the costs paid before reaching the target. In the following, we focus
on the latter semantics, more fitted to the case study, we will be interested in.
We start by establishing some properties of these games. Although there may not always exist Nash
equilibria in these games, we describe a subclass in which there always exist some. First we observe
that when several players play at the same time concurrently, one can encounter a situation similar to the
rock-paper-scissor game, in which there is no (pure) Nash equilibrium. However, even in a turn-based
game (i.e. a game in which, in each state, only one player is in charge of choosing the next state), there
may not always exist a Nash equilibrium. More precisely, we show that—unlike in some other classes
of games—it is possible that each player cannot independently guarantee his cost to decrease arbitrarily,
while a coalition of all players can achieve this goal. We then show that this is the only situation that
prevents Nash equilibria from existing in those games: we prove that, when the cost of any play is
bounded from below by a fixed threshold, then a Nash equilibrium exists in the game.
We demonstrate the applicability of this theory in a practical situation. We consider a case study
introduced by an industrial partner of the CASSTING project, and model it in a game formalism in order
to build a controller fulfilling a specific set of goals. The case study consists of a local grid of eight
houses equipped with solar panels. The solar panels produce different amounts of energy during the day.
When they need to consume energy, the houses can either rely on energy produced by the solar panels
(their own or one of the seven other houses’) or buy it from the global grid. The aim of the case study
is to minimise the use of energy bought from the global grid as a whole, while preserving the incentive
of each house to share the energy produced by their solar panel with others, if not used directly by them.
We assume that the energy produced by the solar panel has to be used within a small interval of time
and can not be stored (a provision for storage of energy could be added at little increase of modelling
1http://www.cassting-project.eu/
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complexity). Concretely, we want to generate a controller producing a schedule of the different tasks of
the houses, such that each house has no incentive to deviate from this schedule. For this, we assume that
there are two types of controllers. One global controller which has information about all the houses, their
requirements and their production. Also, there are local controllers in every house communicating with
the global controller and controlling the tasks that take place in this house. Local controllers have no
information about the consumption or production of the other houses: they are only aware of the energy
produced by their own solar panels and the energy requirement of the house at any specific interval of the
day. In our experiments, this schedule is computed as a strategy in a multi-player concurrent game that:
1. minimises the energy bought from outside; and 2. minimises the bill to be paid by each house. We
also assume that the houses are not bound to follow the schedule and can deviate from it. However, such
deviations could lead to a severe increase in the overal consumption from the global grid (if, for instance,
a house decides to use its own energy locally instead of injecting it on the local grid as prescribed by
the schedule, then the total amount of energy available on the local grid might be too low, and energy
might have to be bought from the global grid). For this reason, we devise proper incentive and a penalty
mechanism ensuring that the houses would not have any interest in deviating from the proposed schedule.
2 Theoretical background
We first introduce the class of multi-player games we are interested in. We fix a number N of players
and let {1, . . . ,N} be the set of players. A concurrent min-cost reachability (MCR) game is a tuple
〈V,F,(Ai)i6N ,E,Next,(ωi)i6N〉 where V is a finite set of vertices partitioned into the sets V1, . . . ,VN ,
F ⊂V is a subset of vertices called targets, for every vertex v ∈V , Ai is a finite set of actions for player i,
E ⊆V ×V is a set of directed edges, the set of successors of v by E is denoted by E(v)= {v′ ∈V | (v,v′)∈
E}, Next : V ×∏i Ai → V is a mapping such that for all v and a1, . . . ,aN , Next(v,a1, . . . ,aN) ∈ E(v),
ωi : E → Z is the weight function for player i, associating an integer weight with each edge. Without
loss of generality, we assume that every graph is deadlock-free, i.e. for all vertices v, E(v) 6= /0. In the
following we let A = ∏i6N Ai. A finite play is a finite sequence of vertices pi = v0v1 · · ·vk such that for
all 0 6 i < k, (vi,vi+1) ∈ E . A play is an infinite sequence of vertices pi = v0v1 · · · such that every finite
prefix v0 · · ·vk, denoted by pi[k], is a finite play.
The total-payoff of a finite play pi = v0v1 · · ·vk for player i is obtained by summing up the weights
along pi , i.e. TPi(pi) = ∑k−1ℓ=0 ωi(vℓ,vℓ+1). The total-payoff of a play pi is obtained by taking the limit over
the partial sums, i.e. TPi(pi) = liminfk→∞ TPi(pi[k]). The cost of a play, costi(pi) is +∞ if pi does not visit
any target, and TPi(v0v1 · · ·vℓ) otherwise, with ℓ the least index such that vℓ ∈ F: it reflects that players
want to minimise their cost, subject to the imperative of reaching the target as a primary objective.
A strategy for player i is a mapping σ : V+ → Ai. A play or finite play pi = v0v1 · · · conforms
to a strategy σ of player i if for all k, there exists (a1, · · · ,aN) ∈ A such that ai = σ(v0, . . . ,vk), and
vk+1 = Next(v,(a1, . . . ,aN)). A profile of strategies is a tuple (σ1, . . . ,σN) where for all i, σi is a strategy
of player i. For all profiles of strategies ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σN), for all vertices v, we let Play(v,~σ) be the
outcome of ~σ , defined as the unique play conforming to σi for all i, and starting in v, i.e. the play v0v1 · · ·
such that v0 = v and for all ℓ, vℓ+1 = Next(vℓ,(a1, . . . ,aN)) where ai = σi(v1 · · ·vℓ).
A profile of strategies ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σN) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium from vertex v, if for all players i,
and for all strategies σ ′i , costi(Play(v,(σ1, . . . ,σ ′i , . . . ,σN)))> costi(Play(v,~σ )). Observe that we assume
that the objective of every player is to minimise its cost; thus, intuitively, a profile of strategies is a Nash
equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate.
We say that a vertex v belongs to some player i if he is the only one to choose the next ver-
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s
t(a,a) t(a,b)
t(b,a) t(b,b)
(a,a) | (1,0)
(b,b) | (1,0)
(a,b) | (0,1)
(b,a) | (0,1)
(0,0) (0,0)
(0,0) (0,0)
a b
a 1\0 0\1
b 0\1 1\0
Figure 1: A game without pure Nash equilibrium representing the strategic game described by the matrix
on the right: we do not depict the actions on the loops over targets for conciseness.
tex, i.e. for all pairs of actions (a1, . . . ,aN) and (a′1, . . . ,a′N), if ai = a′i then Next(v,(a1, . . . ,aN)) =
Next(v,(a′1, . . . ,a′N)). A game is said to be turned-based if each vertex belongs to some player. When
considering turned-based games, instead of actions, we say that the players to whom the current vertex
belongs chooses directly the next vertex.
2.1 Nash equilibria do not always exist. . .
A natural question is the existence of Nash equilibria in the min-cost reachability games we have just
defined. In order to understand precisely what are the conditions that prevent the existence of Nash
equilibria, we present some examples of min-cost reachability games in which we can show that no such
equilibria exist. We also recall previous results identifying classes of games where such equilibria are
guaranteed to exist. We start with a game that is not turn-based and admits no Nash equilibria.
Example 1. Consider the game in Figure 1 with four target vertices t(a,a), t(a,b), t(b,a), t(b,b), and one
additional vertex s. Assume that there are two players, and each has two possible actions: a and b. From
s the pair of actions (α1,α2) leads to t(α1,α2). If both players choose the same action, the cost for player 1
is 1 and the one for player 2 is 0; if both players choose different actions, the cost for player 1 is 0 and
the one for player 2 is 1. There is clearly no (pure) Nash equilibrium in this game from s since for all
profiles of strategies, either player 1 or player 2 would pay less with another strategy2.
In a turn-based setting, one can also easily exhibit examples with no pure Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Consider a one player game with two vertices v1 and v2 where the latter is the only target.
The set of edges is {(v1,v1),(v1,v2),(v2,v2)}, all with cost −1. In other words, from v1, the player can
either choose to loop, and get a reward (since he seeks to minimise his cost); or to reach the target v2
(in which case the play formally continues with no influence on the cost). In this game, a strategy from
vertex v1 can thus be described by the number of times he will loop on v1 before going to v2. If he never
reaches v2, he pays +∞ which is clearly bad. If he loops n times, a strictly better strategy would be to
loop n+1 times, therefore there is no Nash equilibrium in that game.
In [12, 3], the authors introduce a large class of turn-based games for which they prove that a pure
Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, this result can be used to show that every turned-based
min-cost reachability game with only positive costs admits a (pure) Nash equilibrium. From Example 2,
we already know that when there are negative costs, this result does not hold anymore. In this example,
the (only) player has a family of strategies that allows him to secure a cost which is arbitrary low, hence,
the absence of Nash equilibria is not too surprising. Let us now exhibit a third, two-player example in
which no player has a strategy to guarantee, individually, an arbitrary low cost; but still arbitrary low
2It is however possible to find Nash equilibria that use randomisation (so-called mixed strategies), but we do not consider
such objects in this work.
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A B
C
(0,−1)
(−1,0)
(0,−1) (−1,0)
(0,0)
Figure 2: A turn-based MCR game with no Nash equilibria, but where no player can independently
guarantee an arbitrary low cost.
costs can be secured when the players cooperate. Again, this phenomenon forbid the existence of Nash
equilibria.
Note that here, we only look at pure Nash equilibria. In the general setting of mixed strategies, i.e.
where the players pick randomly a strategy according to some probability distribution over the set of pure
strategies, there is a Nash equilibrium in this game. Indeed if we let σ n the strategy consisting in looping
n−1 times around v1 and then going to v2 (ensuring a cost of −n), the distribution consisting in picking
σ n with probability 6
(pin)2
(one can easily check that it is a distribution) ensures an expected cost of −∞.
Example 3. Let G be a turn-based game with two players 1 and 2, and three vertices A, B, and C.
Vertex C is the only target. A and C belong to player 1 and B belongs to player 2. The edges and the
weight function are depicted in Figure 2 (e.g. ω1(A,C) = 0 and ω2(A,C) =−1).
Proposition 1. There is no pure Nash equilibrium in the game G, neither from A nor from B.
Proof. We do the proof for plays starting in A, it is easily adapted to the other case. Note that the set
of finite plays ending in A is A(BA)∗ and the set of finite plays ending in B is (AB)+. Let (σ1,σ2) be a
profile of strategies and let pi be its outcome. We consider several cases for pi:
1. If pi = (AB)ω then Cost1(pi) = Cost2(pi) = +∞. Then, let σ ′1 be the strategy of player 1 defined by
σ ′1(A(BA)n) =C for all n and σ ′1(piC) =C for all finite play pi , then the outcome of (σ ′1,σ2) is ACω
and Cost1(ACω) = 0, which is strictly better than +∞, and player 1 has an incentive to deviate.
2. If pi = (AB)nCω for some n, then Cost2(pi) = −n. Let σ ′2 be the strategy obtained from σ2 by
letting σ ′2((AB)n) = A and σ ′2((AB)n+1) = C. One can easily check that the outcome of (σ1,σ ′2)
is either (AB)n+1Cω or (AB)nACω , and in both cases, the cost of this play for player 2 is −(n+1)
which is strictly better than +∞, hence he has an incentive to deviate.
3. Finally, if pi = A(BA)nCω for some n then Cost1(pi) = −n. Let σ ′1 be the strategy obtained from
σ1 by letting σ ′1(A(BA)n) = B and σ ′1(A(BA)n+1) = C. One can easily check that the outcome of
(σ ′1,σ2) is either (AB)n+1Cω or (AB)n+1ACω , and in both cases, the cost of this play for player 1
is −(n+1), hence, again, player 1 has an incentive to deviate.
We conclude that, in all cases, one of the players has an incentive to deviate, hence no profile of strategies
(σ1,σ2) is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Lower-bounded set of costs
As already outlined, the intuition behind the absence of Nash equilibria in Examples 2 and 3 is the
existence of plays with arbitrary low costs (even if these plays can not be enforced by a single player, as
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shown by Example 3). We will now show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the absence of
Nash equilibria. In other words: in a min-cost reachability game (with arbitrary weights), if the set of
possible total-payoffs of finite plays is bounded from below, then a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist.
Theorem 1. Let G be a turn-based MCR game respecting the following condition: for all players i, there
exists bi ∈N such that all finite plays pi satisfy TPi(pi)>−bi. Then there exists a pure Nash equilibrium
from all vertices in G.
We now prove this theorem. For that purpose, let G = (V,{t},(A j) j6N ,E,Next,(ω j) j6N) be a con-
current MCR game (we will restrict ourselves to a turn-based game when necessary). For the sake of
simplicity, we assume here that there is a unique target t for all players, and the only outgoing edge
from t is the loop (t,t). Note that the following construction would hold for multiple targets as well.
In the following, we fix a player i, and we assume that there exists bi ∈ N such that for all finite
plays pi , TPi(pi) >−bi. We will show how to translate the game G in a game G′ with only non-negative
weights for player i, with a relationship between strategies of i in both games. This will in particular
preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. The game G′ = (V ′,{t},(A′j) j6N ,E ′,Next′,(ω ′j) j6N) is built
as follows:
• V ′ = {t}⊎V ×{−bi, . . . ,−1,0}: we keep the negative part of the current total-payoff in the vertex
for player i, and add a fresh target vertex t;
• A′ = A;
• for all (v,v′) ∈ E and for all (v,c) ∈V ′ with v 6= t, then, letting c′ = min(0,c+ωi(v,v′)), if (v′,c′)
is in V ′, the edge e = ((v,c),(v′,c′)) is in E ′, ω ′i (e) = max(0,c+ωi(v,v′)) and ω ′j(e) = ω j(v,v′)
for j 6= i. Furthermore if Next(v,~a) = v′, then Next((v,c),~a) = (v′,c′);
• for all vertices (t,c) ∈V ′, there exists an edge e = ((t,c),t) with ω ′i (e) =−bi + c and ω ′j(e) = 0
for j 6= i. For all ~a, Next((t,c),~a) = t.
Lemma 1. For all finite plays v1v2 · · ·vkvk+1 in G, and (v1,0)(v2,c2) · · · (vk,ck) in G′,
• there exists j 6 k such that ck = TPi(v j · · ·vk) in G (note that if j = k this is equal to 0), and in G′
TPi((v1,c0)(v2,c2) · · · (vk,ck)) = TPi(v1 · · ·v j) ,
• if vk 6= t, there exists a unique c such that ((vk,ck),(vk+1,c)) is an edge of G′.
Proof. The first point is proven by induction as for all j, c j is either equal to 0 or to c j−1 +ω(v j−1,v j).
The second point is a consequence of the first. As ck is the weight of a partial play ending in vk, ck +
ω(vk,vk+1) is the weight of a partial play ending in vk+1 thus min(0,ck +ω(vk,vk+1))> bi.
As a consequence, for all plays or finite plays pi = v1v2 · · · in G, there exists a unique play or fi-
nite play pi = (v1,0)(v2,c2) · · · in G′ such that if Next(vi,~a) = vi+1 then Next′((vi,ci),~a) = (vi+1,ci+1).
Following this, one can map every strategy σ in G to a strategy σ of the same player in G′ satisfying
σ(pi) = σ(pi) for all finite plays pi . Furthermore, for all strategies σ in G′, there exists a unique strategy
σ ⋆ for the same player in G such that σ ⋆(pi) = σ(pi), for all finite plays pi .
Proposition 2. 1. Let ~σ be a profile of strategies in G and~σ its image in G′. Then, for each initial ver-
tex v, costi(Play((v,0),~σ )) = costi(Play(v,~σ ))− bi and cost j(Play((v,0),~σ )) = cost j(Play(v,~σ ))
for all j 6= i.
2. Let ~σ be a profile of strategies in G′ and ~σ ⋆ its image in G. Then, for each initial vertex v,
costi(Play(v,~σ )) = costi(Play((v,0), ~σ ⋆))− bi and cost j(Play(v,~σ )) = cost j(Play((v,0), ~σ ⋆)) for
all j 6= i.
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Proof. We prove here only the first item, the proof of the second being similar. Let pi = Play(v0,~σ) =
v0v1 · · · . As a consequence of the above remarks, pi = Play((v0,0),~σ ). Therefore, if pi does not reach a
target then neither does pi , thus costi(Play((v,0),~σ )) = costi(Play(v,~σ )) = +∞. Assume now that pi =
v0 · · ·vktt · · · . By definition, pi = (v0,0) · · · (vk,ck)(t,ck+1)t · · · . From Lemma 1, there exists j 6 k+ 1
such that ck+1 = TPi(v j · · ·vk+1) and TPi((v1,c0)(v2,c2) · · · (t,ck+1)) = TPi(v1 · · ·v j). Thus costi(pi) =
TPi(v1 · · ·v j)+ ck+1−bi = costi(pi)−bi. It is immediate that for all j 6= i, cost j(pi) = cost j(pi).
As a consequence, there is a Nash equilibrium from v in G if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium
from (v,0) in G′. Note that we could not have reached this result simply by shifting the weights above
0, as we need a device to simulate the fact that the sum of the weights can also decrease during the
computation.
By applying this construction for all players, we can show that if there exists a lower bound on the
total-payoff of the finite plays for all players (i.e. the hypothesis of Theorem 1 is fulfilled), then one can
construct a game G′ with only non-negative weights such that there is a Nash equilibrium in G′ if and
only if there exists a Nash equilibrium in G. From the fact that all turn-based MCR-games with non-
negative weights have a pure Nash equilibrium [12], one obtains the proof of Theorem 1 in the special
case where G is turn-based (since G′ is also turn-based in this case).
2.3 Characterising Nash equilibria outcomes
In this section we present a very handy characterisation of Nash equilibria that has recently been used in
several works [9, 3]. This intuitive characterisation, in the spirit of the folk theorem for repeated games,
has been formally stated in [8], and a more general and more involved version can be found in [2].
Roughly speaking, this characterisation amounts to reducing the computation of a Nash equilibrium in
an n-player games to the computation of the Nash equilibria in n versions of 2-player games, obtained by
letting each player of the original game play against a coalition of all the other players. The usefulness of
this technique stems from the fact that 2-player (zero-sum turn based) games have been widely studied
and there exists many algorithms and tools to solve them.
Thus, we first introduce a variant of our games, called 2-player zero-sum MCR games. Such a game
is very similar to a 2-player MCR game, the only difference is while one of the players has the same
objective as in a standard game (i.e. reaching a target while minimising its cost), the second player has a
completely antagonistic goal, i.e. either avoiding the targets or maximising the cost for the first player. In
those games, we are interested at the infimum cost that the first player can ensure, that we call the value
of the game, denoted value(G) for a game G, supposing that an initial vertex is described in G.
Then, we introduce the notion of coalition games. Given an MCR-game G, a player i, and a finite
play pi ending in vertex v, the coalition game Gi,pi is the 2-player zero-sum turned-based MCR game
played on G from v, where i is the player who wants to reach the target while minimising his costs; and
his adversary, denoted −i, has the same actions as the product of all players except i, and its goal is
antagonistic to the one of i. Furthermore, to obtain a turn-based game, we assume that −i chooses its
actions before i (see [8] for a formal definition). It matches the intuition that player −i is a coalition of
all players but i, and whose goal is to make i pay the most.
The characterisation we present works in the case of action-visible MCR-game, i.e. in a game where
we assume that the players know the actions that have been played by everyone. A similar result holds
in the general case [2], but we do not need it here as the games introduced in the next section are all
action-visible. More precisely to be action visible, we assume that for all v,v′, there exists at most one
vector of actions ~a such that Next(v,~a) = v′.
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Now, assume an action-visible MCR-game, a player i and a play pi = v1v2 · · · . An i-deviation from pi
is a finite play pi ′ = v1 · · ·vℓv′ such that if we let~a and ~a′ be the vectors of actions satisfying Next(vℓ,~a) =
vℓ+1 and Next(vℓ,~a′)= v′, then ai 6= a′i and a j = a′j for all j 6= i. Intuitively, this means that all players have
agreed to play according to pi , and an i-deviation describes a finite play in which player i has betrayed
the other players. One can now state the theorem from [8].
Theorem 2. Let G be an action-visible MCR-game and pi = v1v2 · · · . Then pi is the outcome of a Nash
equilibrium, if and only if, for all players i and for all i-deviations pi ′ = v1 · · ·vℓv′:
costi(pi)6 costi(pi
′)+ value(Gi,pi ′).
In other words, this theorem allows us to say that a Nash equilibrium can be characterised by (i) a
play that all players agree to follow; and (ii) a set of coalition strategies that the faithful players will
apply in retaliation if one player deviates. It also provides a heuristic to construct a Nash equilibrium by
solving a sequence of 2-player zero-sum turn-based games. It works as follows: (i) compute for each
player i, a strategy σi ensuring the least possible cost against a coalition of all other players; (ii) consider
the outcome pi of the profile ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σN); (iii) check that all deviations satisfy the above property;
and (iv) if it is the case, compute coalition strategies in case of a deviation.
Note that this construction does not always work, as the outcome pi could fail to satisfy the property
of Theorem 2, but it has been proved to always succeed in many known classes of games [3, 12]. We use
this technique in the case study, as described in the following section.
3 Modelling
In this section, we model the CASSTING case study described in the introduction via a concurrent MCR
game. Recall that the problem consists of: 1. a group of houses H = {H1,H2, · · · ,HN} in a cluster with
solar panels; 2. a production function giving the (probabilistic) distribution of amount of solar energy
produced throughout the day; 3. a list of tasks that the houses need to perform throughout the day. For
the sake of modelling, we divide each day into 15 minutes intervals. Thus, we have 96 time intervals.
We take the production function prod : [1,96]→ Z giving the production of energy from each house at
any given time interval within the day. We assume that for each house there is a local controller and
one global controller for all the houses together. The local controller submits a list of tasks along with
favourable time interval (deadline) of the day for the task, and receives a schedule indicating which task
to perform when. The global controller gathers a list of tasks from houses and computes a schedule of
the tasks so that it achieves the goal; it also sends the respective schedules to the local controllers. Note
that the local controllers have no information about other houses and their consumption.
3.1 Tasks
We assume that, at the beginning of the day, each house submits a list of tasks that should be performed
at preferred interval of time. Let the list of tasks be given as T = {T1,T2, . . . ,Tm} for some m. Without
loss of generality, we assume that each task can be completed within only one time interval. The energy
consumed by a task during each interval is given by the function ET : T → Z. The task list submitted
by each house Hi is of the form T Li = (〈t1, I1〉,〈t2, I2〉, . . . ,〈tk, Ik〉) where ti ∈ T and Ii is an interval of
[1,96] for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that lists of tasks of different houses
are disjoint. We denote by Tasks(T Li) = {t1, t2, . . . , tk}, the tasks in the task list of house Hi. The goal of
the houses is to complete each task within the given preferred interval and minimise
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1. the overall imported energy consumption of all the houses;
2. as well as the bills of each house (the billing functions is described hereunder).
Example 4. Consider the scenario with two houses H1 and H2. Let consider only two time intervals
and the production function Prod(1) = 4 and Prod(2) = 2. Thus at first interval both houses produce 4
units of energy and at second interval both houses produce 2 units of energy. Let the tasklist of H1 be
(〈t1, [1,2]〉) and that of H2 be (〈t2, [1,2]〉) where the energy required for tasks are ET (t1) = 4, ET (t2) = 5.
3.2 Concurrent MCR game to minimise the energy
We first consider our primary goal being to minimise the amount of imported energy used during the
day. To model this situation, we use a concurrent MCR game G with N players representing the local
controllers of each house, as follows:
• V = [1,96]× (∏i∈H 2Tasks(T Li)) contains the current timeslot and the set of tasks already performed
in the past;
• F = [1,96]× (∏i∈H Tasks(T Li)) describe that every task has been performed;
• Ai = Tasks(T Li) is the set of tasks, for all players i;
• E = {((d, p),(d +1, p′))} with p ⊆ p′;
• Next((d, p),(p1, p2, . . . , pN)) = (d +1, p∪ p1∪ p2∪ ·· ·∪ pN) if all tasks of pi are associated to an
interval including d in the task list T Li (other actions are not fireable);
• ωi is defined as ET for all tasks of house Hi performed in the current time, while taking into account
the solar energy production, i.e. ωi((d, p),(d + 1, p′)) = ∑t∈(p′\p)∩Tasks(T Li) ET (t)− prod(d). A
negative weight implies a use of energy produced outside the house (either by other houses or
outside the local grid), while positive weight induces an excedent of solar energy in the house.
Note that by construction G is an acyclic graph (always incrementing the interval component of the
vertex). We will consider thereafter only this game starting in the initial vertex v0 = (1, /0, . . . , /0).
For each edge, the sum of the weights incurred by all the houses represent the amount (positive or
negative) of solar energy excedent after the perfomance of all the tasks of the current time. Since we want
to reduce the amount of energy bought from outside the local grid, we use as a global weight function
the negative part of this sum of weights: ω((d, p),(d + 1, p′)) = min
(
0,∑t∈p′\p ET (t)−N× prod(d)
)
.
A negative weight implies a use of energy produced outside the local grid, while a null weight induces
an excedent of solar energy in the local grid.
We decide first to interpret the previous game as a one-player game, by supposing that all houses play
in coalition to achieve the common target of finishing all the tasks within the given interval and reducing
the usage of non-solar energy. This is a one-player MCR game with the weight function ω . The coalition
strategy obtained will actually be a schedule for the tasks of each house respecting the intervals that
minimises the amount of non-solar energy used (or even maximise the solar energy excedent produced
by the local grid to be exported).
Example 5. For the example developed above, the optimal schedule in the coalition game is to perform
task t2 at interval 1 and perform task t1 at interval 2 in which case no energy from outside is required.
On the contrary, an excedent of 3 units of energy is produced which can sold to the external grid causing
lowering of electric bill.
3.3 Billing function
Even though the schedule obtained from G gives the optimal use of non-solar energy and hence a priori
low billing costs as a whole for the houses, the bill obtained may not be favourable for the houses taken
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individually. Thus, all houses might not have a strong incentive to collaborate to the common good. We
start by defining properly the billing function we use in our model.
Given a tuple of sets of tasks performed by each house at any specific time point d ∈ {1, . . . ,96}, we
will compute the bill incurred by house Hi on the interval [d,d +1). The total bill for Hi would then be
the sum of bill incurred by this house for each interval of the day.
Consider a tuple of set of tasks performed by all the houses at a specific time point d, TP = (〈t11 , t12 ,
· · · , t1k1〉, · · · ,〈t
N
1 , t
N
2 , · · · , t
N
kN 〉). We denote the tasks performed by Hi as Tasksi(TP). Let the price of buying
energy from other houses be Pin and the price of buying energy from outside be Pout . The energy produced
by each house is given by prod(d). Now, for each house Hi, the excess energy used by the house is given
by ∑t∈Tasksi(TP) ET (t)− prod(d). Thus, the total energy bought by all the houses individually (either
from the local grid or from the outside) is TotC = ∑i max
(
0,∑t∈Tasksi(TP) ET (t)− prod(d)
)
. On the other
hand, the energy bought (negative or positive) from outside the grid is TotO = ∑i ∑t∈Tasksi(TP) ET (t)−
N × prod(d). The total bill for all the houses is then BTot = (TotC − TotO)×Pin + TotO ×Pout . Since
each house pays its own share of this total bill, the price that will be billed to house Hi is ωBi (TP) =
BTot/TotC×∑t∈Tasksi(TP) ET (t)− prod(d). Note that if a house produces more energy at a specific interval
than it consumes, the bill is negative signifying income from selling the excess solar energy.
Now that we have the billing function fixed, we can present the example where the optimal energy
schedule might not give the minimum bill for an individual house.
Example 6. The optimal schedule for the total energy presented in the previous example (Example 5) is
not optimal with respect to the bill paid by house H1. For example, if H1 performs task t1 at interval 1, it
does not have to pay anything. Whereas, with optimal scheduling, H1 has to pay for two units of energy
to H2 and receives the price of only one unit of energy from H2.
Thus, our next goal will be to modify the weights of the game G to take into account the bill rather
than the energy. The new weight function is now given by ωi((d, p),(d + 1, p′)) = ωBi (TP) where TP is
the list of tasks performed in p′ \ p. We call G′ this new game. The hope is to find that the need for
the households to minimise their utility bill is an incentive to minimise the global energy consumption
from the grid (thereby encouraging sharing of locally produced energy). More formally, we need to
compare the energy consumed by a Nash equilibrium of G′ to the optimal energy consumption found in
the optimal coalition strategy of G.
As the game is concurrent there is in general no Nash equilibrium. Therefore we start by transforming
G′ in a turn-based game G′t , adopting a round-Robin policy for the choice of actions. This can be achieved
by enhancing the set of vertices with {1, . . . ,N}, and decomposing an edge into a sequence of N edges,
where each house now plays in turns. In the last step, we have all the information to compute the bill
for each house. Since the game G′t is acyclic, there are only finitely many plays, thus their costs for each
players are bounded. As a consequence of Theorem 1, we know that there exists (pure) Nash equilibria
in G′t .3 Thus we can follow the heuristic for constructing Nash equilibria presented in Section 2.3 to
construct the Nash equilibrium strategy profile. We construct coalition two-player MCR games G′i for
each house Hi, where Hi plays in order to minimise its bill against the coalition of all other houses.
Solving every such game G′i, we obtain the optimal strategy σi for each house Hi. In addition to that, we
follow the construction by detecting when a player deviates from its optimal strategy and then changing
other players’ strategy to a punishment strategy.
From the point of view of the case study, even though the strategies (σi)16i6N are generated by the
global controller, they are executed by local controllers and thus, each house can not detect whether some
other house has deviated from its optimal strategy or not. Hence, for our case, we only take the strategy
3Notice that we could also obtain this result directly from the fact that every acyclic turn-based game has a Nash equilibrium.
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profile (σi)16i6N (without the deviation punishment) and, while computing the bill, we add the provision
for the global controller to add a penalty to the bill. This is done by modifying the weight function to
incorporate such changes: we add an extra integer to the bill of house Hi that is equal to the minimum
bill that can be ensured by Hi according to the strategy σi whenever Hi deviates from σi. This ensures
that any deviation from Hi will result in at least twice the minimal bill that can be ensured by Hi.
4 Implementation
We implemented the model using PRISM. PRISM has introduced a module for solving (turn-based)
Stochastic Multi-Player Games (SMG). We use this module in order to solve different non-stochastic
games and extract optimal cost strategies out of them. The PRISM module is also used to check the
performance (consumption, wastage and bill) of a strategy over an instance of the game.
We have first implemented the one player game version of an instance where all houses play in coali-
tion towards the common goal of maximising the utilisation of solar energy. Here, the behaviour of each
house is modeled using a module in the PRISM representation. Each module contains the constraints of
the houses with respect to tasks as transitions. The favorable interval of the task is denoted as guards on
the transition and the energy cost for the task is reflected using an update to the global energy variable.
We solve the game and obtain a bound of the maximum possible utilisation of the solar energy among
all the houses. Note that, as shown by the example in the previous section, this schedule does not ensure
that the bill paid by each of the houses is minimum. We allow PRISM to solve such a one-player game
to figure out the minimum possible collective energy requirement of the houses (Emin).
Next we have implemented the methodology with multi-player turn-based MCR games. Recall that
the houses do not have information about consumption and requirement of energy by other houses. The
natural way of modelling such scenarios is through concurrent games where each player plays a move
without the knowledge of other players moves. Since PRISM can handle only turn-based games, we
try to implement a random order among the houses at each step of the game. We then compute the
separate games G′i for each house Hi and find optimal strategy σi for house Hi such that the bill for Hi
is minimised (billi). Even though generating strategy is included in PRISM, it does not allow storing
the strategy output in a proper format for further usage from the command interface. We modified it to
include that property. The outcome of this strategy profile (σi)16i6N is then used to compute the final
strategy for the controller. Finally, we formulate another game where any deviating move by house Hi
from σ contains a modification of the billing function of Hi as an addition of integer value equal to
billi. At the end, the final strategy is loaded in PRISM and the values (energy consumption, billing. . . )
corresponding to the strategy are computed. The final game with the strategy profile (σi)16i6N again
results in various different values for total collective energy consumption, and bills for each house Hi for
completing all the tasks. These values are compared with the original game to compare the performance
of the strategy profile. The table below shows the result for different numbers of houses and tasks. For
each such pair, we have taken 10 examples and presented the average of values obtained. The table
represents the average difference of bills (in percent) between two strategies - one where the houses
collectively reduce the total energy consumed in coalition and the other where the houses minimizes
their own bill. Note that the bill is computed for each house by taking into account the cost of excess
energy used in any interval. However, the amount each house gets from excessive production of energy is
not accounted for in the bill. As shown in Table 1, the collective energy with the strategy profile obtained,
remains the same as the minimum energy required to complete all the tasks. Moreover, the result shows
that on average there is a decrease in bill paid by each house in the case where every house follows the
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Houses Tasks Number of cases Total energy difference Average bill difference
2 3 10 0.0 -8.08
2 4 10 0.0 -17.15
3 2 10 0.0 -13.07
3 3 10 0.0 -29.73
4 2 10 0.0 -14.89
Table 1: Results of the implementation over the case study
strategy profile and does not deviate from it. This also shows that there is (hopefully) less inclination
towards deviating from the suggested strategy by each house.
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